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What’s the link?
‘It’s the economy, stupid’: that catchphrase
dominated the US presidential election
campaign 20 years ago, which culminated
in Bill Clinton ousting the sitting
president, the first George Bush. The
feeling that voters’ decisions will be
influenced primarily by concerns about
jobs and taxes is echoed in this year’s
campaign. Many commentators are calling
it ‘the economy election’ – and many
economists are featuring in debates about
which policies will best address the
challenges facing the American economy.
One prominent example is Nick Bloom
of Stanford University, who has long
worked with the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP). His index of US
economic policy uncertainty, described in
this magazine earlier in the year, has been
widely cited, including by the Fed
chairman, Ben Bernanke. Nick is part of a
CEP team that will soon be publishing a
series of US election analyses, exploring
research evidence on some of the key
policy battlegrounds – healthcare,
inequality, trade, taxation and the 
‘fiscal cliff’.
Here in the UK, policy discussions are
focused on what can be done to get the
economy growing. The LSE Growth
Commission, co-chaired by CEP’s director
John Van Reenen and due to report by
the end of the year, will provide some
longer-term perspective for that debate.
Meanwhile, John continues to warn of
the dangers for growth of excessive fiscal
austerity – not least on Twitter
(@johnvanreenen). His predecessor, CEP’s
founder director Richard Layard, argued
along similar lines in his recent
‘manifesto for economic sense’, written
with Nobel laureate Paul Krugman.
One long-recognised driver of growth
is education. As the new academic year
gets underway, this issue of CentrePiece
highlights how important it is for
teenagers to understand the value of
going to university, even in the new
world of high tuition fees. And our cover
story by Steve Gibbons calculates how
much the quality of schools is reflected in
local house prices – the subject of many
dinner party conversations.
Steve’s article is the tenth in our
series looking back at the ‘big ideas’ that
have emerged from CEP research and the
stories of their subsequent impact on
policy. The previous surveys – on
unemployment, inequality, social
mobility, education, minimum wages,
economic geography, competition and
productivity, innovation and wellbeing –
are all available on our website
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/
bigideas.asp). And the breadth of
continuing CEP work is reflected in
articles here on topics ranging from what
drives how much people earn to what
will drive the next financial crisis.
Romesh Vaitilingam, Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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Steve Gibbons describes how a series of
influential CEP studies has confirmed the
widespread belief that there is a link between
house prices and the quality of local schools –
and explains the nuances of the findings and
their significance for public policy for
education, cities and social mobility.
I
t is a truth universally
acknowledged in the chatter of
middle class dinner parties in
Britain that good schools push
up house prices. Stories of
anxious parents buying or
renting at inflated prices in the catchment
areas of well-regarded schools are
commonplace. But before CEP’s research
on this issue began more than a decade
ago, there was almost no British evidence
to back up these anecdotes.
In a series of widely quoted studies,
CEP researchers have been at the
forefront of efforts to bring rigorous
evidence on the scale of these effects into
the public domain. Thanks to this work,
the link between schools and house prices
is now an established fact. What’s more,
this finding has a significant influence on
both education policy – including
measures to improve poorer children’s
access to good schools – and private
sector behaviour – for example, the way
that estate agents present property
details.
What’s a good school worth?
So how much are people prepared to pay
for good state schools? It turns out that
the amounts are substantial. The most
recent CEP research for England shows
that a primary school one standard
deviation above the average in terms of
the performance of its pupils in key stage
2 tests (at age 11) attracts a house price
premium of around 3%. This means that
a school right at the top of the league
tables attracts a premium of around 12%
relative to one at the bottom. At the time
of the study in 2006, this was equivalent
to £21,000 (Gibbons et al, 2012).
A similar picture emerges for Paris,
where in 2004, the best schools attracted
a premium of up to €17,500 (Fack and
Grenet, 2010). And this is not just a
European story: countless studies from the
United States and elsewhere produce
comparable results, as shown in our
extensive surveys of the research evidence
(for example, Black and Machin, 2010;
Machin, 2011). In fact, a link between
better schools and higher house prices
has emerged as one of the most stable
empirical regularities, with studies
worldwide reporting effects of a similar
order of magnitude.
These numbers make a great deal of
sense in terms of investment in children’s
future labour market skills. The potential
earnings benefits in later life from a good
state primary education outstrip the costs
of buying a house near a good school.
Big ideas
Valuing schooling
through house prices
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Why this matters for policy
While on the surface it might look like a
trite research question, establishing the
link between schools and housing costs is
of much more profound importance than
just informing parents’ school choices.
Education economists are interested in the
question because they want to learn
about how much people value school
quality and because they want to
understand which dimensions of school
quality matter most to parents.
Answers to the question are also
crucial for guiding public policy and
deciding how to spend public money in
ways that generate the greatest public
benefit. House prices help here because
their geographical patterns trace out the
quality and value placed by society on a
wide range of public and environmental
amenities, including schools.
The influence of school quality on
house prices also feeds back into school
admissions – the so-called ‘selection by
mortgage’ of the richest and brightest
children into the best schools. This
process reinforces school segregation and
inequalities in performance and
achievement, and reduces social mobility
across the generations. The problem is
rooted in the fact that places are usually
offered first to children who live nearest
to a school.
Faced with strong evidence on house
price effects and in an effort to give poorer
children the opportunity to enrol in high
performing schools, recent policy has tried
to loosen the link between where children
live and the schools they attend. This
thinking underlies the use of lotteries and
banding for allocating places in popular
schools, most famously in Brighton.
The link between schools and house
prices also sheds light on the general
shortage of what parents perceive as high
quality schools, influencing the policy
measures to extend competition, choice
and the quality and diversity in provision
through the academy and ‘free school’
programmes.
Outside the field of education, urban
economists, estate agents and planners
are also interested in school/house price
patterns because they provide information
about how housing markets operate, the
factors causing the segregation of rich
and poor into different neighbourhoods
and the more general spatial structure 
of cities.
A link between
better schools and
higher house prices
is one of the most
stable empirical
regularities
worldwide
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The nitty gritty:
how to work it out 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the
research question, getting good answers
about the link between school quality 
and local house prices turns out to be far
from straightforward. The line of inquiry
comes from a long tradition in the US
research literature, developed from 
work on valuing air quality and other
environmental amenities where there is 
no explicit market price.
The theory is intuitively easy to
understand. Spending on housing is
spending on a bundle of goods: structural
quality, access to transport, green space,
shops, safety from crime, views,
environment and so on, alongside school
quality. The market price of a house
therefore reflects the availability of these
attributes and amenities, and buyers’
willingness to give up other forms of
consumption to pay for them. The
premium that buyers pay for a house close
to a good school relative to an equivalent
house near a bad school (holding other
factors constant) intuitively tells us
something about the willingness to pay for
good schooling.
But distilling these school effects from
data on house prices and school quality
presents a big challenge. The words
‘holding other factors constant’
encapsulate the problem. Ideally, we would
like to compare houses that are identical in
all respects apart from the quality of the
schools to which they offer access, so as to
work out the direct ‘causal’ effect that
schools have on prices.
Researchers have developed
increasingly sophisticated techniques to
try to do this. The basic procedure is to
take the price of a house and its
associated local school quality, and
compare them with the prices of similar
neighbouring houses that offer access to
a different set of schools. The assumption
here is that the close neighbours provide
a set of (almost) identical ‘twins’ with
which comparisons can be made.
This method is used in the first CEP
paper on the topic (Gibbons and Machin,
2003), in extensions with more detailed
housing data (Gibbons and Machin, 2006)
and in work using more advanced
techniques for assigning schools to
houses in the data (Gibbons et al, 2012).
These analyses also refined the idea
by comparing closely neighbouring houses
on either side of the boundaries of school
catchment areas, an idea borrowed from
an analysis of the US city of Boston
(Black, 1999). The reasoning is that
houses that are next to each other but in
different catchment areas are effectively
identical apart from a sharp difference in
the quality of the school that a child gets
to attend.
In Britain, school catchment areas are
rarely rigidly defined, so we have used the
boundaries of local education authorities
(LEAs), which acted as catchment area
boundaries for primary schools. Few
primary school age children attend schools
in LEAs outside that of their home, so
neighbours in adjacent LEAs can face very
different quality schools.
In this research, we effectively show
that if you live on an LEA boundary on the
side of a good school, you will be paying
more than your neighbour across the
street who lives in a different LEA with less
successful schools. The same idea is
applied in the study of Paris, where
catchment areas are set out explicitly.
What matters to parents
about schools?
Although these studies have generated
rigorous evidence on the school quality
premium, just knowing by how much
school quality pushes up house prices isn’t
really enough. There are many other
important and more nuanced questions,
to which answers are needed.
Which aspects of schools drive up
house prices? Is it headline performance
indicators, the peers that a child can
expect at school, the quality of the
teaching, the leadership, the buildings and
infrastructure, the expenditure per pupil or
something else? Does school quality
matter more in some parts of town than
others? And does the availability of private
schooling as an outside option set a cap
on the house price premium? 
A big question is what parents are
actually paying for, especially whether
they are just looking for a school that
boosts their child’s achievement or
something more subtle about the school
environment. We show that the answer is
a little of both (Gibbons et al, 2012).
Educational researchers typically
measure the effectiveness of school
teaching through the ‘value-added’ a
school provides – that is, how much a
child’s test scores improve after a number
of years at the school relative to other
children. Our research pitches this measure
in a race against characteristics of the
school intake – such as their early
achievements, ethnicity and poverty – to
see which wins out as a factor driving
local house prices.
For sale
The potential
earnings 
benefits in later
life from a good
state primary
education
outstrip the 
costs of buying 
a house near a
good school
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The result is too close to call. 
Value-added is always crucial, but prior
ability of the school intake and associated
socio-demographic characteristics –
particularly entitlement to free meals – are
also strong drivers. It looks like people
value schools not only for what they can
do to raise their child’s achievements but
also for the quality of their intake. This is
not that surprising when you consider that
the main public source of information on
school quality is the league tables – and
the headline indicators are responsive to
both intake and teaching effectiveness.
Other evidence also finds that
objective indicators of school quality
influence demand for secondary school
places. For example, we show that the
proportion of children reporting that they
are happy has no effect on house prices,
while intake quality and value-added again
have a large influence (Gibbons and Silva,
2011).
Is it worth going private?
Once we know that the quality of state
schools raises house prices, an obvious
question is how these costs compare with
the costs of a private education. Our
evidence shows that paying for state
education in England through housing is
still a cheaper option than paying for
private education. But the gap is not as
big as you might think.
Our calculations imply that getting a
child into a state primary that delivers in
the top 10% of achievement (assuming
you could find such a school) would set
you back about £26,000 at 2006 prices.
That’s about £3,000 a year if you decided
to pay that amount off over the seven
years of primary schooling on a 5%
mortgage interest rate (Gibbons et al,
2012). By comparison, seven years of
private schooling at the time would have
cost an average of £3,800 per term or
nearly £80,000. So state primary schools
still look like a good deal for parents.
The availability of private schools as an
outside option also comes into play in
determining the geographical patterns of
the school/house price premium. This issue
is specifically addressed in the study of
Paris, where private schooling takes a
much greater share than in England.
The evidence from Paris shows that
penetration of the local market by private
schools noticeably dampens the effects of
state schools on house prices. Presumably
this is because home-buyers in these areas
are much less interested in state school
quality. Ironically, local private schools –
institutions normally accused of increasing
educational inequalities – could help
alleviate inequality in access to state
schools, by reducing the demand pressures
on top performing state schools.
Summing up
Dinner party chatter about schools and
house prices turns out to be a fruitful
avenue of research. It is possible to
quantify the link – and the link matters for
educational policy. ‘Pricing in’ public goods
through housing is one of the most
fruitful and still under-exploited areas in
applied economics, and the wealth of new
data on house prices and local outcomes
(such as crime) will make this a growing
area in the future.
Steve Gibbons is research director of the
Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC), a
reader in economic geography at LSE and a
research associate in CEP’s education and
skills programme.
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Industrialised countries today face serious risks –
for their financial sectors, for their public finances
and for their growth prospects. Peter Boone and
Simon Johnson explain how this has happened
and why there are more and worse crises to come.
The doomsday cycle turns:
WHO’S 
NEXT?
T
here is a common problem
underlying the economic
troubles of Europe, Japan
and the United States: the
symbiotic relationship
between politicians who heed narrow
interests and the growth of a financial
sector that has become increasingly
opaque. Bailouts have encouraged 
reckless behaviour in the financial sector,
which builds up further risks – and will
lead to another round of shocks, collapses
and bailouts.
As we described in a previous issue of
CentrePiece, this is the ‘doomsday cycle’
(Boone and Johnson, 2009/10). The cycle
turned in 2007-08 and was most
dramatically manifest in the weeks and
months that followed the fall of Lehman
Brothers, the collapse of Iceland’s banks
and the botched ‘rescue’ of the big three
Irish financial institutions.
The consequences have included
sovereign debt restructuring by Greece, as
well as continuing problems – and lending
programmes by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European
Union – for Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
Italy, Spain and other parts of the euro
area remain under intense pressure.
Yet in some circles, there is a sense
that the countries of the euro area have
put the worst of their problems behind
them. Following a string of summits, it is
argued, Europe is now more decisively on
the path to a unified financial system
backed by what will become the
substance of a fiscal union.
The doomsday cycle is indeed turning
– and problems are undoubtedly heading
towards Japan and the United States: the
current level of complacency among
policy-makers in those countries is
alarming. But the next turn of the global
cycle looks likely to hit Europe again and
probably harder than before.
The continental European financial
system is in big trouble: budgets are
unsustainable and growth is nowhere on
the horizon. The costs of bailouts are
rising – and the coming scale of the
problem is likely to undermine political
support for the euro area itself.
The structure of the
doomsday cycle
In the 1980s and 1990s, deep economic
crises occurred primarily in middle- and
low-income countries. These crises would
grab the world’s attention from time to
time, but all proved to have little lasting
effect beyond the countries most directly
affected. In some cases, the experience of
a crisis was actually cathartic and helped
clear the way for stronger growth.
In contrast, the crises we should now
fear are in relatively rich countries with the
world’s ‘most developed’ financial
infrastructure. These crises have the
potential to reduce growth profoundly
around the world.
The problem is that the modern
financial infrastructure makes it possible to
borrow a great deal relative to the size of
an economy – and far more than is
sustainable relative to growth prospects.
The expectation of bailouts has become
built into the system, in terms of
government and central bank support. But
this expectation is also faulty because, at
times, the claims on the system are more
than can ultimately be paid.
For politicians, this is a great
opportunity, enabling them to buy favour
and win re-election. The problems will
become apparent, they calculate, on
someone else’s watch. So repeated
bailouts have become the expectation not
the exception.
For bankers and financiers of all kinds,
this is easy money and great fortune –
literally. The complexity and scale of
modern finance make it easy to hide what
is going on. The regulated financial sector
has little interest in speaking truth to
authority: that would just undercut their
business. 
Banks that are ‘too big to fail’ benefit
from giant, hidden and very dangerous
government subsidies. Yet despite
repeated failures, many top officials
pretend that ‘the market’ or ‘smart
regulators’ can take care of this problem.
For the broader public, none of this is
CentrePiece Autumn 2012 
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relationship that
encourages
irresponsible
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clear – until it is too late. The issues are
abstract and lack the personal drama that
grabs headlines. The policy community
does not understand the issues or
becomes complicit in the schemes of
politicians and big banks. The true costs of
bailouts are disguised and not broadly
understood. Millions of jobs are lost, lives
ruined, fiscal balance sheets damaged –
and for what exactly?
Over the past four centuries, financial
development has strongly supported
economic development. The market-based
creation of new institutions and products
encouraged savings by a broad cross-
section of society, allowing capital to flow
into more productive uses. But in recent
decades, parts of our financial
development have gone badly off-track –
becoming much more a ‘rent-seeking’
mechanism that draws support from
politicians because it facilitates
irresponsible public policy. 
The question is: who will be hurt by
this structure and in what order? There are
three prominent candidates: Japan, the
United States and the euro area.
Japan’s long march 
to collapse
To understand the pervasive nature of
modern financial instabilities, start with
the least discussed reckless situation in a
major country today. Figure 1 shows the
path of Japan’s ratio of debt to GDP over
the last 30 years, including IMF forecasts
to 2016. 
Japan has a rapidly ageing population.
The average Japanese woman today has
1.39 children, far fewer than is needed to
replace the elderly. This means that the
total population is set to decline by 26%
by 2050. Having peaked in the mid-1990s,
the country’s working age population will
decline by a staggering 40% between
1995 and 2050. Naturally, many of the
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Figure 1:
Japan gross and net general government debt as 
a percentage of GDP
Source: IMF
back in the form of pensions, the
government will need to reduce its budget
deficit of 8% of GDP and start running a
sizeable budget surplus. Unless there is a
sudden burst of romance and fertility,
there will be far fewer Japanese taxpayers
in the future to pay this debt. 
The government has not been 
willing to raise taxes in a timely manner to
match its spending. The latest agreement
is for a modest (5%) increase in the retail
sales tax, which would only be fully
implemented in 2015. Why would it 
do so in the future when the burden on
the remaining workers will need to be
ever larger?
Japan is saved from immediate
pressure by the fact that about 95% of its
government debt is held by domestic
residents. As long as these investors are
satisfied with very low – or perhaps
negative – real rates, this situation 
can continue.
But sooner or later, Japan’s dreadful
fiscal mathematics will catch up with the
government. There is no sign yet of a
broad loss of confidence, but major shifts
in market sentiment are not typically
signalled in advance.
America’s reckless 
private finance
In the United States, the symptoms are
different. Figure 2 illustrates the US
version of the doomsday cycle: the rise of
total credit as a fraction of national
income. Major players in the financial
system have become too big to be
allowed to fail – and consequently receive
large subsidies.
The latest crisis has led to the largest
monetary and fiscal bailouts on record.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that the final fiscal impact of the crisis of
2007-08 will end up increasing debt
relative to GDP by about 50 percentage
CentrePiece Autumn 2012 
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Bailouts have
encouraged
reckless
behaviour in the
financial sector,
which builds up
further risks
ageing Japanese have been saving for their
retirement for decades. They deposit those
funds in banks, buy government bonds,
hold cash savings or buy Japanese equities. 
With an ageing population and 
slower growth, the broad outlines of
responsible policy are straightforward.
Japan should become a big investor in
countries with younger populations,
providing the capital investment needed to
generate growth. Those countries can then
return the savings to the Japanese as they
retire. Singapore’s government does just
that via one of the world’s largest
investment funds.
Instead, for the last two decades,
Japan’s government has been running
large deficits, borrowing and then
spending the savings of the young. When
the elderly finally demand their savings
points. This is the second largest debt
shock in US history: measured in this 
way, only the Second World War cost
more. (For more detail, see Johnson and
Kwak, 2012.)
The alliance that leads to
unsustainable finance here is simple: the
US financial system earns large ‘rents’
(excess returns to labour and capital) from
the implicit subsidies offered by taxpayers.
These rents finance a massive system of
lobbyists and campaign donations that
ensures ‘pro-bailout’ politicians win
elections regularly. 
Each time the United States has a
crisis, politicians and technocrats admit
their errors and buttress regulators to
ensure that ‘it never happens again’. Yet
still it happens, again and again. We are
now on our third round of the so-called
Basel international rules for banks, with
the architects of each new reform
admonishing the previous architects for
their mistakes. There’s no doubt that the
United States will someday soon be
correcting Basel 3 and moving on to 
Basel 4, 5, 6 and more. 
The problem that the country faces 
is that with each crisis, the financial risks
are getting larger. If continued in this
manner, bailing out the system will
eventually be unaffordable. When the
United States finally runs out of enough
savers to buy the bonds needed to bail
out the system, it will suffer the ultimate
collapse. (For more detail, see Schularick
and Taylor, 2012.)
Roughly half of all US federal debt is
currently held by non-residents. So US
fiscal policy remains viable only as long as
the dollar is seen as the ultimate safe
haven for investors. But what is the
competition? Japan is not appealing today
as a haven and it is unlikely to become
more appealing in the near term. A great
deal of the prospects for the US budget
and growth therefore rest on what
happens in the euro area.
The euro area:
flawed dreams
There is no sign that the euro area will
emerge from crisis any time soon. 
The incentive structure of the euro
system ensured that each country’s
financial sector clamoured to join it. The
key feature that made it so attractive was
the liquidity window at the European
Central Bank (ECB). 
For smaller countries, the ECB is a
modern day Rumpelstiltskin. Rather than
spinning straw into gold, the ECB converts
unattractive government and bank-issued
securities into highly liquid ‘collateral’ that
can be readily swapped for cash from the
ECB. This feature instantly made sovereign
and bank bonds very attractive debt
instruments. Knowing that the borrowers
had essentially unlimited access to liquidity
from the ECB, investors became willing
lenders at low interest rates to all banks in
the euro area. 
Given such attractive features, it is
easy to understand why 17 countries
mastered the political debate to join the
euro system. It is also easy to understand
how the system got abused and why it
will be so difficult ever to make it ‘safe’. 
If the Japanese can’t control their public
finances and if the United States can’t
control its too-big-to-fail banks, the added
complexity of merging 17 regulators and
17 national governments into a system
where someone else can be made
responsible for bailing out the
intransigents seems a financial and
regulatory nightmare. 
Such a system is sure to be crisis-
prone. The Federal Reserve and the federal
CentrePiece Autumn 2012 
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government attempt to provide bailouts
when there is trouble in the United States.
But in Europe, the bailouts are only partial.
No country has a ‘lender of last resort’ like
the Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan –
so markets are now learning that large risk
premia are needed to reflect default risk in
troubled countries. 
Flexible exchange rates would
undoubtedly make it easier to manage
these crises. Devaluations instantly 
reduce wages and raise countries’
competitiveness. If Greece had managed a
large devaluation, it could probably have
avoided much of the unemployment and
social turmoil we see today. Instead, each
troubled country in Europe now suffers
when having to force down wages and
prices during adjustment. 
This system poses great dangers to
global financial stability. The euro area
faces myriad problems, including
insufficient bank capital, high levels of
private and public debt and the 
chronic inability of some member
countries to grow. 
It is now common to hear policy-
makers blackmailing populations: unless
the euro area survives, tragedy will result.
And it is true that tragedy will result: we
only need to look at the rise of complex
derivatives and the dangers they pose
were the euro area to dismantle. (For a
broader discussion of Europe’s problems,
see Boone and Johnson, 2011 and 2012.)
Figure 3 illustrates the growth of euro-
denominated interest rate derivatives, the
notional value of which now totals more
than 10 times the GDP of the euro area.
Regulators commonly use net figures
when they consider ultimate risk for banks
and this makes sense under the usual
circumstances of bankruptcy. But when a
currency area breaks up, the practice of
netting off contracts needs to change
dramatically and banks will be facing far
more risks than regulators and risk officers
currently report. 
For example, if a German bank has a
contract with a French bank and an
opposite identical contract with a German
pension fund, it can net those two
contracts and report the ultimate risk as
zero. (Of course there is counterparty risk,
but under standard agreements,
Figure 3:
Outstanding interest rate swaps denominated in euros 
($ trillion nominal value)
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derivatives are cleared instantly at
liquidation so the counterparty risks can
be netted). 
But if investors start to believe that
there will be new currencies in each
country, then the two contracts in this
example are no longer offsetting so they
must not be netted. It is reasonable to
think that after any demise of the euro,
the contracts between two German
counterparties will be converted into
deutsche marks, while contracts with
international partners will be disputed or
maintained in a euro proxy. 
As a result, risk officers at banks
should understand that if the euro area
breaks up, all banks in Europe face
enormous and unaccountable currency
risk. Each of their ‘euro’ assets and
liabilities needs to be examined to
understand into which currency it would
be converted. (For more discussion on
redenomination issues, see Nordvig and
Firoozye, 2012.)
The threat of future crises
The tragedy of the euro area appears
unavoidable, but it reflects far greater risks
that will spread to Japan, the United
States and other advanced economies.
Through our financial systems, we
have created enormous, complex financial
structures that can inflict tragic
consequences with failure and yet are
inherently difficult to regulate and control.
We are at the behest of our politicians and
financial sectors to prevent them from
creating dangers. Yet around the world,
our political and financial systems have
aligned to build these dangers rather than
suppress them. 
The continuing crisis in the euro area
merely buys times for Japan and the
United States. Investors are seeking refuge
in these two countries only because the
dangers are most imminent in the euro
area. Will these countries take this time to
fix their underlying fiscal and financial
problems? That seems unlikely.
The lesson from all these troubles is
clear: the relatively recent rise of the
institutions of complex financial markets,
around the world, has permitted the
growth of large, unsustainable finance.
We rely on our political systems to check
these dangers, but instead the politicians
naturally develop symbiotic relationships
that encourage irresponsible growth.
The nature of ‘irresponsible growth’ is
different in each country and region – but
it is similarly unsustainable and it is still
growing. There are more crises to come
and they are likely to be worse than the
last one.
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and chairman of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org),
a charity based in the UK. He is also a
director at Salute Capital Management.
Simon Johnson is a professor at MIT's Sloan
School of Management, a senior fellow at the
Peterson Institute for International
Economics and a member of the
Congressional Budget Office's Panel of
Economic Advisers.
They are co-founders of The Baseline
Scenario, a leading economics blog
(http://baselinescenario.com).
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A
pplications for university
places are down for the
2012/13 academic year,
but it is too early to
assess the impact of the
near trebling of tuition fees on demand
for higher education or on socio-economic
inequality. In recent research, we have
aimed to find out what school students
know about the costs and benefits of
going to university – and what would be
the impact on their knowledge and
aspirations of an ‘information campaign’.
We invited all secondary schools in
London to take part in the study. Of
these, 54 schools participated in the main
evaluation, which took place during the
2010/11 academic year. The participating
schools were above average in terms of
GCSE performance and relatively less
deprived as measured by the percentage
of students eligible for free school meals.
At each school, all students in year 10
(14/15 year olds) completed a 40-minute
survey (under exam conditions). Eight to
12 weeks later, they completed a very
similar survey. In between the two
periods, some schools were given an
information package about the costs and
benefits of staying in education, whereas
other schools were given the package
after their students had completed the
second survey. 
The focus of the survey was on the
costs and benefits of staying in full-time
education, with a particular emphasis on
university. The fieldwork took place at the
time that the hike in fees was announced,
so the results show not only the impact of
the information campaign but also the
short-term impact of media reporting of
the fee increase. We measure media
reporting as the number of articles about
fees that appeared on the BBC website
between January 2010 and the survey
dates (which varied across the schools so
that students had different levels of
exposure to the media).
The information experiment
Schools were randomly assigned to two
groups: ‘treatment’ schools, which got the
information package between the two
surveys; and ‘control’ schools, which got it
What impact did media reporting of the near
trebling of tuition fees have on school students’
understanding of the costs and benefits of
university? A CEP experiment run by Sandra
McNally and colleagues sheds light on this
question as well as on broader issues about the
importance of clear information about the value
of higher education.
Student
awareness
of the costs
and benefits of 
higher education
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later. The purpose was to test whether
students in treatment schools showed any
change in knowledge and aspirations
compared with students in control schools.
We chose Year 10 because these students
do their GCSE exams one year later (at the
end of Year 11) and are already making
important decisions about what to do
subsequently.
The central component of the
information package was a password-
protected website (‘Whats4me’), designed
to convey simple information about the
costs and benefits of staying in education
– including the likely improvement in
earnings capacity and employment
prospects, and information about fees,
loans and maintenance grants.
The website was updated with any
announcements about university finance
as they occurred. By chance, the project
coincided with major changes. First, the
independent review of higher education
and student finance led by Lord Browne of
Madingley reported in October 2010. The
most controversial of its recommendations
– that the cap on fees, which had risen to
£3,300 per year at the time of the review,
should be removed altogether – received a
great deal of press attention.
The government response came
shortly afterwards, in November 2010,
with the announcement that fees would
not be unlimited but capped at £9,000
per year, and that government funding for
certain subjects would be removed
altogether so that they would be funded
entirely by fees. Again, this announcement
70
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Figure 1:
BBC reports on tuition fees
There are
substantial 
gaps in school
students’
knowledge of
very basic facts
about the costs
and benefits 
of staying 
in education
Tuition fees
Universities are allowed to charge up to £9,000 per year. Tuition fees are deferred, meaning that
students do not have to pay their fees upfront, but instead can borrow the full amount from the
government under generous terms.
Maintenance loans
These loans are means-tested, according to the parental income of the student. In 2012/13, the
maximum student loan available will be £5,500 per year, and the minimum amount, available to all
students regardless of parental income, will be £3,575 per year. Student maintenance loans are repaid
in the same way as tuition fee loans.
Maintenance grants
Some students are entitled to maintenance grants, which do not have to be repaid. Students whose
parental income is less than £25,000 per year are entitled to £3,250 per year. As parental incomes rise,
the grant entitlement is reduced, so that students whose parental income is over £42,600 per year
receive nothing.
Repayment of fee and maintenance loans
Students do not have to repay their loans until they have graduated university and are earning
£21,000 per year. Then, they repay 9% of their earnings over this amount, which will usually be
deducted from their earnings automatically in a similar way to income tax. A graduate earning
£25,000 would repay £360 per year. Repayment continues for 30 years or until the graduate has
repaid the loan in its entirety. Interest is added onto the loan each year, on a means tested-basis.
Graduates earning £21,000 or less per year will incur no interest, while graduates earning £41,000 per
year will incur interest of 3% per year; interest is tapered between 0% and 3% for those earning
between £21,000 and £41,000.
Table 1:
Basic facts about financing university education
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received a great deal of press attention,
with much coverage focused on the
potentially negative effects of the fee
increases on student participation.
Media reporting is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which counts the number of
articles on the BBC website that
mentioned fees between January 2010
and the time of our second survey. The fee
increases were met with a great degree of
public anger, including a protest by tens of
thousands of students and lecturers in
November 2010. Nevertheless, the rise in
fees was successfully passed through
parliament the following month.
The fortuitous timing of our project
made it possible to test the impact on
students’ knowledge and aspirations of
both our information campaign and media
reporting. One crucial difference between
our campaign and media reporting is that
the latter emphasised the huge rise in
fees, without always mentioning the
favourable terms of loans and the
availability of grants (see Table 1).
There are three main aspects 
of our results:
 The poor state of knowledge in
participating schools.
 The effects of our information
campaign and media reporting, which
often work in opposite directions.
 The difference in how information from
both sources affected students from
different backgrounds. To illustrate this,
we report differences between students in
independent and selective state schools
and students in comprehensive schools.
We also report differences between
students eligible for free school meals and
other students in state schools.
The state of school 
students’ knowledge
The first column of Table 2 shows the
percentage of students in the first or
‘baseline’ survey who agreed with
statements in five categories: knowledge
of student finance; perceived importance
of financial constraint; opportunity cost;
knowledge about the benefits of staying in
education; and future intentions.
For example, answers to the
‘knowledge’ questions (of student finance
and the benefits of staying in education)
indicate that fewer than half of students
knew that fees are paid after university and
once they have a job. Similarly, fewer than
half regarded student loans as a
‘cheaper/better way to borrow money than
other types of borrowing’. 
While most students realised that
staying longer in education increases the
probability of finding a job, about one in
five did not know this. Furthermore, many
students did not realise that expected
earnings vary depending on the subject
they study and the university they attend.
This matters because ill-informed students
might not take their education seriously
enough. 
Previous research has shown that what
determines whether students go to
university is largely set before they finish
their compulsory education (at the end of
Year 11). So we should not be waiting
until exams have been sat and subject
choices made before ensuring that
students have the correct information on
which to base their future decisions. The
fact that careers information classes are
not specifically resourced or required by
government does not help create the right
incentives for schools.
Effects of the information
experiment and media
reporting
The second and third columns of Table 2
show the effects of the information
experiment and media reporting. These
are estimated by comparing pupils in the
Misperceptions
are easily
corrected:
a light-touch
information
campaign 
can have sizeable
effects on 
student attitudes
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financial constraints on staying in
education, the information experiment
and media reporting had opposite effects.
Our information campaign led students to
think that staying in education would be
affordable (loan conditions and grants
were carefully explained) whereas media
reporting led students to think that going
to university would be ‘too expensive’.
This difference is evident in all three
questions on perceived financial
constraints. The information experiment
reduced negative perceptions of
affordability across the board – for
example, the proportion of students put
off by financial aspects of university fell by
five percentage points.
Media reporting, on the other hand,
increased the negative perceptions of
affordability in all cases. For example, the
proportion of students put off by financial
aspects of university increased by 6.5
percentage points. This is a sizeable
impact when put alongside the baseline
level of agreement of 25.7%. 
The information experiment had a
downward effect on the perceived
opportunity cost of going to university
while media reporting had virtually no
impact on responses to this question.
On knowledge about the benefits of
staying in education, media reporting had
no effect that is statistically different from
zero. But the information experiment
increased the probability that students
perceive that they have a better chance of
getting a job if they stay in education to
the age of 18 or if they go to university.
Table 2:
Effects of the information campaign and media reporting
Notes: The data cover 54 schools and over 12,000 students.
The numbers in bold are statistically significant at 5% level.
Knowledge of student finance
Know that university fees are paid after university and have a job 46% +5.8% +9%
‘Student loans are a cheaper/better way to 
borrow money than other types of borrowing’ Agree 48.6% +7.6% 0%
Perceived importance of financial constraint
Would the financial cost of staying in education 
prevent you from staying on in education after Year 11? Yes 11.7% -3.9% +2.4%
Would the financial aspect of going to university make 
you think of not applying? Yes 25.7% -5% +6.5%
‘Going to university is too expensive for me and my family’ Yes 22.2% -2.2% +6.6%
Opportunity cost
‘Going to university would mean waiting too long before I 
could earn a full-time wage’ Agree 24.3% -3% +0.02%
Knowledge about the benefits of staying in education
Better chance of getting a job if stays on to 18 Agree 79.8% +2.3% -0.6%
Better chance of getting a job if goes to university (compared to leaving at 18) Agree 80.4% +3.3% +1.6%
Will earn about the same no matter what university subject I study Agree/don’t know 42.7% -5.2% +1.9%
Will earn about the same no matter what university I go to Agree/don’t know 53.4% -5.6% +2.7%
Future intentions
Plan to stay on in full-time education after age 16 77.9% +2.9% -2.1%
Think it is very or fairly likely that they will ever apply to go to university to do a degree 87.4% -0.3% -1.7%
Think it is very likely that they will ever apply to university to do a degree 59% +0.6% -4%
Mean 
at baseline
Effects of the
information
experiment
Effects of
media
reporting
treatment and control schools and taking
account of some baseline characteristics. 
The information experiment and
media reporting worked in the same
direction for knowledge of when fees are
paid, increasing the probability of correctly
understanding the basics of when fees are
paid by 5.8 and 9 percentage points
respectively (from a baseline of 46% of
students, who knew the right answer in
the first survey).
Moreover, our information experiment
increased the probability of agreeing that
‘student loans are a cheaper/better way to
borrow money than other types of
borrowing’ by 7.6 percentage points (from
a baseline of 48.6%) while media
reporting had no effect.
For the perceived importance of
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Table 3a:
Effects: independent and selective state schools 
compared with comprehensive schools
Independent and selective state schools (18 schools)
Perceived importance of financial constraint
Would the financial cost of staying in education prevent you from staying on 
in education after Year 11? Yes 5.5% 0.3% +1.7%
Would the financial aspect of going to university make you think of 
not applying? Yes 18% -4.5% +2.3%
‘Going to university is too expensive for me and my family’ Yes 13.1% -1.1% +2.2%
Comprehensive schools (36 schools)
Perceived importance of financial constraint
Would the financial cost of staying in education prevent you from staying on 
in education after Year 11? Yes 13.6% -5% +3.8%
Would the financial aspect of going to university make you think of 
not applying? Yes 28.1% -5.2% +5.6%
‘Going to university is too expensive for me and my family’ Yes 25% -2.2% +6.6%
Mean at
baseline
Effects of the
information
experiment
Effects 
of media
reporting
Students at
independent
schools are much
less likely to 
feel financially
constrained 
than students at
comprehensive
schools
At the same time, the information
experiment reduced the probability of
agreeing with incorrect statements 
about choice of subject and university 
by 5.2 and 5.6 percentage points
respectively (from baseline values of 
42.7% and 53.4%). 
Finally, the information experiment had
an impact on whether students plan to
stay in education – but it had virtually no
impact on university intentions. But the
effect of media reporting was to reduce
the probability of stating ‘it is very likely I
will ever apply to university to do a degree’
by four percentage points. It is worth
noting that future intentions about staying
in education are much higher than what is
likely to transpire in reality, as has been
shown in the Longitudinal Survey of Young
People in England.
Our results indicate that media
reporting and a fairly ‘light-touch’
information campaign have quite sizeable
effects on student attitudes – at least in the
short term. Of course, this does not
necessarily translate into behaviour. But
there is certainly a strong correlation
between students’ attitudes and their
subsequent behaviour. 
On the negative side, the experiment
shows substantial gaps in student
knowledge about very basic facts about the
costs and benefits of staying in education.
More positively, it shows that such gaps can
be easily filled – and in a cost-effective way.
If there is a chain of causation 
between student beliefs about the
affordability of higher education and how
hard they work to ensure they can access
opportunities, then informing students
properly might also be a way of improving
performance at GCSE.
Different effects by 
socio-economic group
To explore differences across socio-
economic groups, we focus on the survey
questions about the perceived importance
of financial constraints in making decisions
about education. We look at how 
students reacted to the information
experiment and media reporting according
to whether they attend independent and
selective state schools or comprehensive
schools, and whether they are eligible for
free school meals.
Table 3a shows how students reacted
according to school type. The first column
shows that there are very large gaps at
baseline. Students at independent and
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But the clear difference between
school types comes with students’
reactions to media reporting. Although the
difference is evident for all three
questions, it is statistically significant for
the statement ‘going to university is too
expensive for me and my family’. 
The impact of media reporting was to
increase the perception of unaffordability
by 2.2 percentage points in independent
and selective state schools but by 
6.6 percentage points in comprehensive
schools.
This gap is also reflected in changes in
aspirations to go to university (which are
not shown in the table). There was no
change in independent and selective state
schools but a fall of three percentage
points in the number of students in
comprehensive schools who think they will
ever apply for university.
These attitudes could influence efforts
to work hard for GCSE exams a year later
and/or actual decisions about staying in
education. In this case, it would mean that
increases in fees – and how these
increases have been reported – widen
gaps in participation in higher education
between different socio-economic groups. 
Table 3b reports effects according to
whether or not students in state schools
are eligible for free school meals. The
differences in the baseline survey are not
so striking for the two groups: students
eligible for free school meals are a little
more likely to say that cost would prevent
them from staying in education post-16 or
going to university. 
But there is a striking difference in
how the two groups respond to media
reporting. It greatly increases the extent to
which students eligible for free school
meals perceive university as unaffordable.
When asked ‘would the financial aspect of
going to university make you think of not
applying?’, media reporting increases the
probability of saying yes by 9.9 percentage
points for students eligible for free school
meals, whereas it only increases by 3.1
percentage points for other students.
The findings are very similar in
response to the statement ‘going to
university is too expensive for me and my
family’. This suggests that the reaction to
media reporting was more severe for
those from poorer backgrounds, in turn
widening the perception gap between
different socio-economic groups, even
though the changes have been designed
to protect students from poor families
(through grants). If perceptions translate
into behaviour, this would have serious
implications for equity and
intergenerational mobility.
Of equal interest are the different
effects of the information experiment on
the two groups. For students eligible for
free school meals, our information
experiment reduced the probability of
saying ‘yes’ to the question ‘would the
financial aspect of going to university
make you think of not applying’ by 
Eligible for free school meals (744 students)
Perceived importance of financial constraint
Would the financial cost of staying in education prevent you from staying on 
in education after Year 11? Yes 15% -6.5% +3.3%
Would the financial aspect of going to university make you think of not applying? Yes 27% -12.9% +9.9%
‘Going to university is too expensive for me and my family’ Yes 26% -10.4% +11.4%
Other students in state schools (3,186 students)
Perceived importance of financial constraint
Would the financial cost of staying in education prevent you from staying on 
in education after Year 11? Yes 12% -2.4% +2.3%
Would the financial aspect of going to university make you think of not applying? Yes 28% -1.8% +3.1%
‘Going to university is too expensive for me and my family’ Yes 23% 0% +5.9%
Mean at
baseline
Effects of the
information
experiment
Effects 
of media
reporting
Perceptions of
the affordability
of higher
education have
widened between
different socio-
economic groups
Table 3b:
Effects: students eligible for free school meals
compared with other students in state schools
selective state schools were much less likely
to feel financially constrained than
students at comprehensive schools: 5.5%
of students in independent and selective
state schools were put off staying in
education by the cost compared with
13.6% in comprehensive schools.
For higher education, 13-18% of
students in independent and selective state
schools were put off by the cost
(depending on how the question is asked)
compared with 25-28% in comprehensive
schools. The impact of the information
experiment was stronger in comprehensive
schools for these questions, reducing the
probability of feeling constrained by
finances by around five percentage points.
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This article summarises ‘Student Awareness
of Costs and Benefits of Educational
Decisions: Effects of an Information
Campaign’ by Martin McGuigan,
Sandra McNally and Gill Wyness, Centre for
the Economics of Education Discussion 
Paper No. 139 (http://cee.lse.ac.uk/
ceedps/ceedp139.pdf).
Martin McGuigan is a PhD candidate at
Queen’s Management School, Belfast.
Sandra McNally is director of CEP’s research
programme on education and skills and a
professor of economics at the University of
Surrey. Gill Wyness is a research officer in
CEP’s education and skills programme.
The Whats4me website is now freely
available: http://www.whats4.me.uk
Policy attention
should focus on
the incentives
that schools have
to invest time
and effort in
providing careers
information
12.9 percentage points (but only by 
1.8 percentage points for other students).
The effects are similar for the statement
‘going to university is too expensive for me
and my family’, which shows that people’s
misperceptions can be corrected.
Conclusion
Our research indicates that school students
have significant gaps in their basic
knowledge about the costs and benefits of
staying in education and going to university.
All the indications are that the hike in fees
in late 2010 – and specifically, media
reporting of the changes – increased the
perception of going to university as ‘too
expensive’.
This perception was significantly higher
in comprehensive schools (compared with
independent and selective state schools) and
among children eligible for free school
meals. If these perceptions influence 
effort at school or behaviour post-16, 
this will increase socio-economic inequality
in the future.
On the positive side, a fairly light-touch
information campaign in schools can
reverse some of these negative effects. 
It can give a more rounded view of the
reforms – stressing the availability of grants
and how loans can be repaid – rather than
focusing on the increase in fees per se. 
An information campaign like the one used
in this project can be effective at low cost.
But we should not assume that
information gets conveyed in the right 
way – or at all – to students. Policy
attention should focus on the incentives
that schools have to invest time and effort
in providing careers information (which is
not regulated and does not influence
‘league tables’) as well as available
resources to ensure that information is
conveyed in an appropriate way.
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Are public sector employees
overcompensated? 
The UK’s coalition government has suggested 
that both pay and pensions in the public sector
are too high relative to the private sector.
Alexander Danzer and Peter Dolton use 
the concept of ‘total reward’ to evaluate this
claim, comparing the lifetime compensation
available to highly educated men working 
in the two sectors.
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R
ecession and public debt
problems have created
huge pressures to reduce
the remuneration of public
sector employees in many
countries. Greece and Ireland have already
done so in nominal terms and most
countries will be doing so in real terms
over the next couple of years. At the 
same time, there are growing concerns
about ageing populations and the future
burden of pension obligations to public
sector employees.
Changes to public sector pay, pensions
or other conditions of service will have
immediate consequences for many things:
fiscal budgets, workforce composition,
service delivery, inequality and relative
remuneration between sectors. So it is
essential that any proposed reforms of the
total remuneration package available to
current and future public sector employees
are evaluated carefully.
Even more fundamental is the need to
clarify how to measure total remuneration
packages so that it is possible to make
proper comparisons between sectors. The
notion of ‘total reward’ (TR) has become
fashionable in human resource
management circles as a way of
measuring employees’ compensation, but
as yet there is no consensus on specifically
what TR should include.
We propose the most
comprehensive measure of
TR to date. It includes not
only salary, bonuses, stock
options, stock grants,
pensions and other monetary
compensation but also hours of work,
holiday entitlements, employer-provided
health insurance as well as job security
(the probability of being made
unemployed).
Our new concept measures 
future benefits in present value terms. 
For this purpose, we define TR for an
average career in a sector as the total
financial benefits and ‘in kind’
compensation, evaluated in money terms
over the lifecycle. 
We compare these measures of total
compensation for the group of highly
educated full-time male employees in the
UK public and private sectors who are 
able to switch easily between the two
sectors. This removes the potential
difficulty that people initially choose a
sector based on decisions that are
unobservable to the statistician. 
We analyse a new data set that brings
together information from the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings, the Labour
Force Survey, the British Household Panel
Study and the English Longitudinal Survey
of Ageing.
Figure 1 provides the motivation for
developing a rigorous definition of TR. 
It shows real annual remuneration for
male graduates working in the public
sector (light blue) and private sector (dark
blue) from the start of their career to
death. The measure comprises earnings,
benefits and pensions.
While the two curves start off quite
similarly at the age of 21, private sector
employees soon develop an income
advantage of roughly £5,000 per year,
which persists almost up to the age of 50.
From the age of 53 onwards, men
working in the public sector are better off,
including during their retirement years.
For these profiles, we estimate the
value of non-monetary TR components at
around 15-20% of total earnings, a non-
negligible fraction. The basic question for
a proper comparison of public and private
sector remuneration (and hence the two
shaded areas of the figure) is whether any
sector gains a clear monetary advantage
over the lifecycle.
The intuition is that once we account
for differences in the risk of
unemployment, the TR in both sectors
should be equal for very similar employees
performing equal work. This is based 
on the long established principle of
‘compensating differentials’, which
assumes that all net disadvantages of a job
will be compensated in monetary terms.
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Figure 1:
Illustration of lifetime income differences
between the public and private sectors
The ‘total
reward’ for
highly educated
male employees
is roughly 
the same in the
public sector 
as in the 
private sector
AGE
A new measure 
of total reward
Our measure of TR is made up of earnings
and pensions, as well as an array of new
components. The asset value of a defined
benefit (DB) pension is evaluated as the
sum of the discounted DB benefits from
retirement until death (based on certain
assumptions about retirement dates and
life expectancy). The actual benefit value
will depend on the pension plan details
provided by different employers (accrual
rates, accrual base, initial vesting period,
lump sum options and survivors’ benefits)
as well as specific employee details, such
as past earnings and years of service. 
DB pension schemes are currently
based on terminal salary value at
retirement, but this rule is currently being
challenged in an attempt to reduce the
generosity of public sector DB pensions.
The accrual fraction is assumed to be one
sixtieth in private sector DB schemes and
one eightieth in public sector DB schemes.
Public sector DB schemes provide a three-
eightieths lump sum per year of tenure,
and the private sector DB schemes are
assumed not to provide a lump sum
payment. All DB schemes have a payment
for the surviving spouse of half of the
pension entitlement.
The asset value of a defined
contribution (DC) plan is calculated by
adding up the employer and employee
contributions that are paid into the plan
and applying real interest rates to the
accumulated fund. The fund is then used,
on retirement, to buy an annuity, which
will yield a stream of earnings until death. 
There are several important differences
between DB and DC pension schemes: 
 First, DB schemes are ‘backloaded’: they
are geared to fractions of final salary in
increment-based pay structures based on
seniority. In contrast, DC schemes are
‘frontloaded’: they are based on cash
contributions to an annuity fund at each
age as a career progresses.
 Second, many DB schemes are portable
to other jobs, whereas in the private
sector most DC schemes are not.
 Third, DB schemes are basically risk-
sharing agreements between the employer
(the state) and the employee, while in DC
schemes the employee bears the entire
interest risk alone.
We suggest that TR at each given age
should comprise accumulated earnings up
to that time plus the accumulated wealth
of a pension scheme, evaluated from the
career start. But note that DB schemes are
based on projected final salaries rather
than current earnings. We call our
measure ‘accumulated lifetime total
reward’ (ALTR).
Our research is subject to some
caveats. For data reasons, our analysis
excludes several groups, such as the self-
employed, most notably public sector GPs.
For the purpose of outlining the concept
of TR, we focus on the public and private
sectors as two large groups, a perspective
that comes closest to the current UK
policy debate.
As yet, our research does not evaluate
the monetary value of various conditions
of work, including stress, control over
time, autonomy, flexibility and work
pressure. Nor do we make provision for
the fact that higher earnings early in the
working life in one sector may increase
private savings and asset accumulation.
While we acknowledge that the timing of
remuneration over the working life may
differ between sectors and thus influence
individual wealth, we ignore this fact
because our principal interest is in work-
related remuneration.
We also implicitly ignore the possibility
that state investment (for example, in
human capital) is different between the
public and private sectors. A final caveat is
the treatment of diverse kinds of risks:
attitudes towards risk (risk aversion) and
time preferences (discount factor) may
differ between public and private sector
employees, but we assume that they are
the same.
Some surprising results for
the public-private sector
compensation gap
Our ultimate goal is to provide an empirical
estimate of TR at any given age and to
compare employees in the public and
private sectors. The valuation of different
TR components is largely driven by the fact
that private sector employees have lower
pension contributions, fewer and less
valuable fringe benefits and higher risks of
unemployment. 
Evidence on earnings is mixed with a
clear dominance of the private sector
earnings profile in mid-career and the
counterbalance of an advantage for public
sector employees at later stages of their
working lives. But private sector employees
work more hours per week, which implies
potentially larger annual earnings
throughout their entire working lives.
To value TR across sectors at every
point in time (age), we add up all
components. The constituent parts of 
our calculations are represented in 
Figure 2 as the lifecycle unfolds. The 
‘zero’ line represents equality in the two
sectors. Positive values represent an
advantage to the public sector and
negative values represent an advantage 
to the private sector.
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows
the well-known fact that there is a
substantial earnings advantage of working
in the private sector for highly educated
male employees between the ages of 30
and 50, while earnings in the public sector
are more valuable towards the end of the
working life.
The top right panel plots the current
value of lifetime earnings including fringe
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For men, the
early career
advantage of
working in the
private sector is
balanced by the
long-run
advantage of
being in the
public sector
This article summarises ‘Total Reward and
Pensions in the UK in the Public and Private
Sectors’ by Alexander Danzer and Peter
Dolton, Labour Economics 19(4): 584-94
(August 2012).
Alexander Danzer is at the University of
Munich. Peter Dolton of the University of
Sussex is a senior research fellow in CEP’s
education and skills programme.
benefits, which results in more favourable
results for private sector employees at
retirement. Pension wealth (in the bottom
left panel) is always substantially more
favourable in the public sector, a fact that
drives much of the debate about public
sector remuneration.
Once we combine these different
components in the bottom right panel, our
ALTR picture emerges, which shows no
advantage for men of either sector at
retirement age. ALTR indeed leads to very
different conclusions than any of the
components.
Our analysis suggests that there is not
equality of TR profiles between the two
sectors at every point in time. Yet the ALTR
for men is equalised between the public
and private sectors over the lifecycle,
suggesting that the private sector earnings
advantage at younger ages is
counterbalanced by the more generous
benefits associated with public sector
pension schemes.
This result implies that male graduates
who choose employment in either of the
two sectors based on their potential early
career reward prospects might get a
biased signal with respect to lifetime
reward. Our results for women (not shown
here) suggest that they are better off in
the public sector at almost any point of
the lifecycle profile.
If employees in both sectors are
exposed to similar disadvantages in the
workplace (for example, stress or mortality
risk), our results imply that after taking
account of pensions, the public sector
confers a high positive TR advantage for
women but a very closely comparable one
for men in the two sectors. This
equalisation of total lifetime remuneration
means, for men, that the early career
advantage of being in the private sector is
balanced by the long-run advantage of
being in the public sector later. 
The insights from this exercise are
straightforward: while the pensions of
highly educated men working in the
public sector are quite generous, there is
no clear advantage of either sector once
we take account of the full complexity of
the comparison. This should caution
policy-makers not to reform public sector
compensation packages prematurely,
unless they accept the implications that
this might have for the quality of
employees they can recruit and retain.
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Figure 2:
Public sector premiums (in percentages) for highly educated
men according to earnings, lifetime earnings, pension wealth
and ‘accumulated total lifetime reward’ (ALTR)
Women are
better off in
the public
sector at
almost any
point in their
lifecycle
AGE AGE
AGE AGE
In bilingual countries like Canada, there are often heated
debates about the role of languages. This may be
because it is rare for bilingualism to be purely symmetric
(one language tends to be dominant) or because of fears
that over time fewer people will speak the non-dominant
language. What’s more, if the population of a bilingual
country grows through immigration, the choices that
immigrants make about learning either or both of the
national languages may alter the balance between them.
The case of Canada is particularly interesting. A majority
of Canadian residents have English as their mother
tongue (nearly three fifths, according to the 2006
census), but native francophones constitute an important
group (more than a fifth) and French is the majority
language in certain parts of the country. What’s more,
around a sixth of Canadian residents have neither English
nor French as their mother tongue – they are ‘allophones’
– and this proportion varies widely across the country. 
Among English-majority cities, Ottawa has a large
francophone minority (nearly a third) and a relatively
small proportion of allophones (less than a sixth). 
In contrast, Toronto is characterised by a large allophone
minority (more than a third) and a tiny francophone
minority (not much more than one in a hundred). 
Across French-majority cities, Quebec City is
overwhelmingly francophone (95%) while 
an eighth of Montreal’s residents are
anglophones and more than a sixth of 
them are allophones.
In the past, legislation has had the clear aim of
encouraging immigrants or minorities to adopt
one of the two languages rather than the other.
For example, provincial educational acts after
1867 banned the use of French as a
medium of instruction in state schools
and stopped funding French-speaking
schools except in Quebec and Ontario.
Even after the 1969 Official Language Act gave
official co-status to English and French, language
issues remained politically sensitive. In 1977, Quebec
passed a law that prevented children from going to an
English school unless their parents had been to one in
Quebec. While this legislation has been partly overturned,
the children of immigrants in Quebec can still only attend
schools that teach in French.
From an economic viewpoint, learning a language is an
investment that pays whenever the financial or time costs
are covered by the returns to the investment. Assuming
that enough economic transactions take place within a
city, we would expect the returns to learning the majority
language for a minority resident to be higher when the
majority language is more widely spoken and lower if the
minority language is widely spoken.
At the same time, if some economic transactions take
place at a national or wider level, we would expect that
in Canada, more people would learn English than French.
After all, English is the country’s majority language and
the world’s current lingua franca.
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Mother tongue: the economics 
of language learning
In cities where two or more languages are widely spoken, what determines whether
people whose mother tongue is a minority language are willing to learn the
majority language? Javier Ortega and Gregory Verdugo look at the drivers of
language assimilation in the English- and French-majority cities of Canada.
in brief...
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Using data from the 2001 and 2006 censuses, we make
use of the variation in the language composition of
Canadian cities to study the determinants of the
assimilation of minority language speakers into a city's
majority language – whether they are allophones,
francophones in English-majority cities or anglophones in
French-majority cities.
Our research shows that official mother tongue speakers
who are in a minority in a city assimilate less into the
city’s majority language than allophones. This could arise
from the institutions of Canada’s official bilingualism,
such as the right for Canadian citizens whose mother
tongue is English or French to get education in that same
language everywhere in Canada (when the number of
children so warrants).
The language composition of cities is an important factor
behind the assimilation of allophones in both types of
city. Specifically, allophones are more likely to speak the
city’s majority language the larger the population share of
majority language speakers and the smaller the number
of speakers of their own mother tongue. Similarly, official
minorities are more likely to speak the majority language
the smaller their own group.
Our research also finds that assimilation into French in
French-majority cities and assimilation into English in
English-majority cities are asymmetric in several respects.
First, francophones assimilate into English more 
than anglophones into French. Second, allophone
assimilation is lower in French-majority cities than in
English-majority cities.
Finally, the impact on assimilation of several individual
characteristics varies across the two types of city. In
particular, the likelihood of anglophones speaking French
in French-majority cities is more sensitive to their
employment status than the likelihood of francophones
speaking English in English-majority cities: if anglophones
in a French-majority city are in work, they are more likely
to speak French. This is a further indication of the
economics that underlies the decision to learn a language.
This article summarises ‘Assimilation in
Multilingual Cities’ by Javier Ortega and
Gregory Verdugo, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 1110 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp1110.pdf).
Javier Ortega is a senior lecturer in
economics at City University London and 
a research economist in CEP’s labour
markets programme. Gregory Verdugo is a
research fellow at the Banque de France.
Francophone
Canadians assimilate
into English-majority
cities more than
anglophones into
French-majority cities
CentrePiece Autumn 2012 
26
In recent times, women have reached many senior
positions in the worlds of politics, business and science.
But their under-representation at the top remains a
mystery, especially given the numbers coming through. 
In the United States, for example, nearly a third of people
who get an MBA are women; and the share of female 
law school graduates and female PhD holders is now
almost 50%.
To understand differences in the attainment – and hence
the compensation – of highly skilled men and women, we
need to ask whether there are gender differences in
performance. With performance being notoriously difficult
to measure (especially in highly skilled occupations), the
legal profession provides an ideal setting: it uses annual
performance indicators that are relatively easy to measure,
transparent and allow for comparisons between people
working in different companies.
Lawyers’ annual performance is evaluated through one
measure in particular: the sum of hours billed to clients
over the course of the year. Commonly known as billable
hours, this method was first introduced in the 1950s and
although its use as a performance indicator is not without
controversy, it is the predominant tool used by law firms in
the United States.
One of the reasons for the success of billable hours is that
it accurately measures the revenue generated by the
lawyers working in a firm. This is not the same as hours
worked, which are usually higher; and more productive
lawyers should be able to work less time than others to
bill one hour, allowing them to work on more
assignments.
A second performance indicator is related to lawyers’
ability to generate new clients, as measured by 
the revenue they generate from new clients.
Recommendations from previous clients and other lawyers
are important ways to generate new client revenue, so
this measure incorporates certain qualitative dimensions of
lawyers’ performance.
We use data from a nationally representative sample of
young Americans, who all graduated from law school in
2000. Initial analysis shows that male lawyers outperform
female lawyers on both measures: on average, men bill
10% more hours and generate 50% more revenue from
new clients. These are large and important differences,
and the likely consequences are higher revenue for the
firm, and employees
compensated for their efforts,
either through higher
earnings, promotion or
other forms of recognition.
Gender gaps in performance:
evidence from young lawyers
Are differences in earnings between highly skilled men and women the result
of differences in performance – and if so, what explains the gender gaps in
performance? Ghazala Azmat and Rosa Ferrer explore these questions by
analysing data on the careers of young American lawyers who graduated at
the turn of the millennium.
in brief...
Maternity and
aspirations generate
differences in 
work performance
between the sexes
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So what explains the gender gaps in performance among
these young, highly skilled lawyers? Our research tests a
number of hypotheses, the first being discrimination: it
may be that senior lawyers influence performance by
deciding on the number and type of cases assigned to
each lawyer. But this is not what the data indicate:
insufficient caseload does affect lawyers’ performance, but
there is no gender difference in caseload assignment.
The data also show no indication that there are gender
differences in assigned tasks, for example, routine tasks
versus those that are more intellectually challenging. Nor
are the returns to each hour billed significantly different
for men compared with women: in other words, billing
rates are the same for both.
A second possible explanation is the effect of maternity:
the right time to become a parent often coincides with
the decisive years for professional success, which
generates a choice between career and family
responsibilities, one that mainly affects women.
Marie Curie, twice a Nobel laureate, said: ‘I have
frequently been questioned, especially by women, of how
I could reconcile family life with a scientific career. Well, it
has not been easy.’ According to our analysis, a century
later, this statement still holds true: having children of pre-
school age adversely affects women but does not affect
men. Yet this only explains part of the performance
differences.
The final set of explanations is behavioural: for example, a
crucial factor in explaining differences in performance
could be the desire to ‘make partner’ – to progress to a
more senior position. Asked about their desire to make
partner on a scale of 1 to 10, 50% of women responded
with 5 or less compared with only 29% of men. This
difference in aspiration remains when restricting the
analysis to those who have a good chance of making it as
partner. It is an important part of the explanation of why
male lawyers outperform female lawyers, especially for
generating new client revenue.
We also find that men and women differ in their areas of
expertise, their time spent ‘networking’ and working at
weekends and their decisions on how to bill their clients.
Yet these are much less relevant in explaining performance
differences than aspirations. This finding is reminiscent of
a comment by Sheryl Sandberg, a senior executive at
Facebook, who said that ‘as a society, we put more
pressure on boys to succeed than we do on our girls’.
So what are the consequences of this difference in
performance? Do they help us to explain the wage gap
between highly skilled men and women? Yes:
performance is actually crucial in explaining the wage gap.
The gender gap in earnings for the lawyers in our data is
20%. Half this gap can be explained by lawyers’
characteristics and the size of their firm: working for a
large firm pays more. In the absence of performance
indicators, the other half would be left unexplained, and
the temptation might be to attribute this part to
discrimination because there do not seem to be
‘observable’ differences between the lawyers. 
But accounting for performance differences, we can
explain a large part of the other half.
According to our analysis, maternity and aspirations
generate performance differences between the sexes –
and these have consequences for employees and the firms
that hire them. The impact of maternity has been widely
discussed in the context of other outcomes (such as
gender gaps in wages and labour market participation)
and could, perhaps, be solved with better childcare or
parental leave policies. 
By contrast, the impact of aspirations seems more
complicated and potentially more controversial. Are the
differences we find in career aspirations a choice or
compliance with a social norm? Our research evidence
suggests an answer.
Asked about how satisfied they are with their career
progression and opportunities for advancement, the
female lawyers in our sample were as satisfied, if not
more satisfied, than their male counterparts. While levels
of job satisfaction may be driven by a number of factors,
they are important indicators of whether these highly
skilled women feel fairly treated in the workplace. 
This article summarises ‘Gender Gaps in Performance:
Evidence from Young Lawyers’ by Ghazala Azmat and Rosa
Ferrer, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1136
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1136.pdf).
Ghazala Azmat is a reader at Queen Mary, University of
London, and a research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. Rosa Ferrer is an assistant professor
at Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Among young lawyers, a key explanation
of gender gaps in performance 
is the difference between men’s and
women’s desire to ‘make partner’
Mental illness is now nearly a half of all ill health suffered
by people in Britain aged under 65 – and it is more
disabling than most chronic physical disease. Yet only a
quarter of those experiencing mental health problems
receive any form of treatment.
The under-treatment of people with crippling mental
illnesses is the most glaring case of health inequality in our
country. It is a shocking form of discrimination because
although psychological treatments exist, they are not
widely available. 
Therapies like cognitive behavioural therapy lead to rapid
recovery from depression or anxiety disorders in over 40%
of cases. If they were more widely available, this would
cost the NHS little or nothing because of the savings on
physical healthcare. The cost would also be fully covered
by savings on incapacity benefits and lost taxes.
For these reasons, the government started an excellent 
six-year programme in 2008 for Improving Access to
Psychological Therapies (IAPT). This is making the situation
much better than it was, especially in some areas. But in
other areas, local commissioners are failing to fund the
necessary expansion and are even cutting mental health
provision, especially for children.
Our report calls for four major changes:
 First, it is essential that the IAPT programme is
completed as planned, since even this will only provide 
for 15% of those in need.
 Second, beyond 2015, there should be another major
expansion, aimed especially at the millions of people who
have mental illness on top of chronic physical conditions.
 Third, the training of GPs needs to include a rotation in
an IAPT service.
 Fourth, recruitment to psychiatry needs to be increased
to handle the more complex cases.
The need for a rethink is urgent. At present, mental
healthcare is, if anything, being cut: it should be
expanded. This is a matter of fairness – to remedy a gross
inequality – and it is a matter of simple economics – the
net cost to the NHS would be very small. When everyone
praises early intervention, it is particularly shocking that
the sharpest cuts today are those affecting young people.
The NHS aims to save £20 billion on existing activities to
finance new activities required by new needs, old unmet
needs and new technology. Nowhere is the case for extra
spending more strong than that for treating mental illness.
In mental health, there is massive unmet need and there
are new treatments that are only beginning to be rolled
out. We appeal to commissioners to think again.
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This article summarises ‘How Mental Illness
Loses Out in the NHS’, a report by CEP’s
Mental Health Policy Group, a distinguished
team of economists, psychologists, doctors and
NHS managers convened by Richard Layard
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/
cepsp26.pdf).
Professor Lord Richard Layard is director of
CEP’s research programme on wellbeing.
Mental illness and the NHS
A report by Richard Layard and colleagues has revealed the shocking scale
of mental illness in Britain – and how little the NHS does about it.
in brief...
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